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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
NATIONAL GUARD--STATE OFFICERS-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST HOLDING OFFICE OF TRUST AND PROFIT UNDER UNITED STATES-
[Kentucky].-Plaintiff, a circuit clerk in a Kentucky court, who held a
captain's commission in the Kentucky National Guard, was directed by
presidential order to report with his unit for a year's training in the United
States army. A provision in the Kentucky constitution prohibits any state
officer from holding an office of trust and profit in the Government of the
United States. Plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory judgment to
the effect that his position in the National Guard was not within the pro-
hibition of the Kentucky constitution. Held: Plaintiff's commission was not
an office of trust and profit in the government of the United States, on the
grounds that his service was to be temporary and that he would not be
required to take any additional oath, but would serve under the commission
issued to him by the Governor of Kentucky. Kennedy v. Cook.,
The effect and meaning of the Kentucky constitutional provision hinges
upon the interpretation of "an office of trust and profit under the United
States."2 The question of what constitutes such an office has come up in
many jurisdictions, for many states have substantially the same constitu-
tional prohibition.3 Generally, the courts have not defined the clause, but
have been content to decide each case on its particular facts. However, in
many cases the courts have cited United States v. Hartwell4 and United
States v. Smith,5 where an officer of the United States was defined as one
who "can only be appointed by the President by and with the consent of the
Senate, or by a court of law, or the head of a department." In Groves V.
Barden,6 the court took the view that an office in the United States govern-
ment is "a public position to which a portion of the sovereignty of the
country, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches for the time being
and which is exercised for the benefit of the public."
The Kentucky court side-stepped an opportunity to lay down a hard and
fast rule which might be used as a guide for similar fact situations in the
future, and limited its decision strictly to facts presented by the record.
No cases could be found involving the narrow question of whether, under
the current Presidential Orders and Army Regulations, a National Guards-
man inducted into the United States army for a year's training is a United
States officer. But the court cited Fekete v. East St. Louis,7 a 1917 case,
which involved a similar problem. In 1916 Congress had passed the National
Defense Act,8 which gave to the President the power to call the National
Guard into the service of the United States. Fekete was a city attorney
and a captain in the National Guard, who, after being inducted into the
1. (Ky. 1940) 146 S. W. (2d) 56.
2. Ky. Const., sec. 237.
3. E. g., Missouri, Alabama, California, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and
Wisconsin.
4. (U. S. 1868) 6 Wall. 385.
5. (1888) 124 U. S. 525.
6. (1915) 169 N. C. 8, 84 S. E. 1042.
7. (1917) 315 Ill. 58, 145 N. E. 692, 40 A. L. R. 650.
8. (1916) 39 Stat. 211, sec. 111, 32 U. S. C. A. (1928) See. 81.
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United States Army in 1917, was commissioned captain in the United
States army and took the federal oath. The court held that Fekete had
ceased to be a member of the National Guard and held an office of "honor
and profit" under the federal government within the meaning of the Illinois
constitutional prohibition.9 Similarly, in Lowe v. State,10 a judge who was
a captain in the National Guard was found to hold a federal office within
the meaning of the Texas constitutional prohibition, after he was called into
the United States Army in 1917.
The federal statute involved in Fekete v. East St. Louis and in the
instant case was the same,13 and in 1917, as well as at the present time,
the National Guardsmen received federal pay and used federally owned
equipment. The basis for the different conclusion in the instant case lay
in the administration of the National Defense Act in 1917, as contrasted
with that of 1940. Under the Act of Congress of 1917, the President had
the power to call the National Guard into the federal service for the period
of the "existing emergency unless sooner discharged."' 2 In 1940, however,
Congress adopted a joint resolution13 authorizing the President merely to
induct the National Guard into the military service of the United States.
Pursuant to this resolution, the president issued an order14 directing the
National Guard to report for a year's intensive training in the United
States Army, and an Army Regulation 0 of March 1940 provided that
National Guard officers in the federal service were not required to take
any additional oath, but were to serve under the commissions issued by the
governors of their respective states.
It is quite probable that similar controversies will arise in other states
which have substantially the same constitutional provisions. If the court's
reasoning is generally adopted by other jurisdictions, the civil income and
economic security of National Guard officers derived from the home state
is not likely to be disturbed under the existing Joint Resolution, Presidential
Orders, and Army Regulations, so long as the state governments have some
control, nominal and tenuous though it may be. V. T. M.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-MISSOURI SOCIAL SECURITY ACT-SUPPORT OF
APPLICANT BY RELATIvE-[Missouri].--The Missouri Social Security Com-
mission denied old age assistance payments under the provisions of the
State's Social Security Act, on the ground that the plaintiff had "income
sufficient to meet his needs for a reasonable subsistence compatible with
decency and health," such income being furnished by his son. Plaintiff ap-
pealed, alleging that the commission refused to consider the son's financial
9. Ill. Const. art. IV, see. 3.
10. (1918) 83 Tex. Crim. Rep. 134, 201 S. W. 986.
11. National Defense Act (1916) 39 Stat. 211, sec. 11, 32 U. S. C. A.
(1928) sec. 81.
12. Act of May 18, (1917) 40 Stat. 76, 50 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec.
201.
13. Pub. Res. No. 96, 76th Cong., 3d sess. (August 27, 1940).
14. Executive Order Fed. Reg. (September 4, 1940) Vol. 5, No. 172.
15. Army Regulations (March 1940) 130-10, see. 12.
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